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Introduction 
 The self-immolation of Mohammed Bouzaizi, a Tunisian fruit vendor, in the front of the 
Sidi Bouzid regional council ignited the most widespread demonstrations the Middle East has 
ever witnessed. During the months that followed demonstrators demanded an end to corrupt 
regimes through both peaceful and violent means. In Morocco, swift constitutional action 
suppressed protests. In Egypt, 18 days of protests led to the removal of President Hosni Mubarak 
and the National Democratic Party; the Party’s office was soon replaced by a military regime. 
 The protest events of 2011 and 2012 will continue to challenge Western perceptions of 
the Middle East. The demonstrations forced journalists and scholars to get past images of the 
Cold War mujahedeen, terrorist organizations, and the Iranian nuclear program. During the 
initial months of what some refer to as ‘the Arab Spring,’ reporters paraded around the idea that 
the Middle East was suddenly looking for a liberal democratic solution. They painted portraits of 
secular protestors trying to remove corrupt tyrants.  
Such portraits are misleading partial truths.  Religion and social movements continue to 
be closely intertwined, in the Middle East as elsewhere.  Devout Muslims across the Middle East 
are finding new ways to carry their beliefs, rituals, and practices over into social movement 
groups.  The popular mobilization in the recent Arab Spring is an excellent opportunity to 
explore these new ways.  The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between 
contemporary Islam and social movement mobilization. How is Islam being carried over into 
every function of a social movement organization? A new generation of protestors has emerged 
in the Middle East, but one thing is for certain: one fruit vendor’s self-immolation, the fall of 
oppressive dictators, and over a year of demonstrations does not unravel the intimate relationship 
between Islam and the millions of devout Muslims living in the Middle East. 
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Literature Review 
Scholars of Middle Eastern social movements have either overemphasized the structural 
explanations of mobilization or have focused primarily on Islamic ideologies. Iran is often the 
primary example for social unrest in the Middle East. Consequently, many of these scholars 
apply Skocpol’s (1979) analysis of French, Russian, and Chinese social movements to Iran’s 
1979 revolution. Studies regarding cross-class alliances, modernization, and international 
pressures dominate the literature on Middle Eastern social movements. Out of the three, the 
modernization theory is the most trite. 
When scholars attempt to explain micro-sociological factors of mobilization, they define 
Islam solely as an ideology. Aside from Iran’s revolution, the Palestinian Intifada (or uprising) 
and Hamas are the primary examples of Islamist movements
1
. Scholars studying the movement 
focus on the beliefs of Muslim Shi’ites and their anti-Israeli sentiments. However, Islam and its 
relationship to social movements cannot be fully understood solely through structural and 
ideological analysis. More importantly, scholars must explain Middle Eastern social movement 
theory independently of Western paradigms. 
Iran and Moderniza t ion  
Scholars of, what Jack Goldstone (2001) calls, the ‘third generation of revolutionary 
analyses’ discredit modernization. Using the 1848 Sicilian revolution, Tilly (1973) argues:  
Population growth, industrialization, urbanization, and other large-scale structural 
changes do…affect the probabilities of revolution. But they do so indirectly, by 
shaping the potential contenders for power, transforming the techniques of 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this paper I refer to Islamist SMOs as groups with explicitly Islamic ideologies. Non-Islamist groups, 
in contrast, do not refer to Islam directly in their ideology, but may still have been influenced by the religion. 
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governmental control, and shifting the resources available to contenders and 
governments. There is no reliable and regular sense in which modernization breeds 
revolution. (447) 
Modernization can only be the precursor for social instability; it alone cannot ignite a revolution. 
Tilly instead suggests “alternative conceptions of justice… the formation of coalitions, [and] the 
legitimacy of the state” as prominent causes of unrest (447).  While his alternatives include both 
macro and micro-sociological explanations, they dismiss the structural changes attributed to 
modernity, such as industrialization.  
Despite Western social movement literature’s de-emphasis on modernization, scholars 
have continued to use the theory to explain Iran during their 1979 revolution. Moving away from 
a traditional agrarian-based society, increasing accessibility to technology, and creating complex 
economic institutions are three ways that Iran has experienced structural transformations in the 
20
th
 century (Skocpol 1994, Denoeux 1993). These changes then led to large-scale discontent 
among Iranians who were forced to adapt to the rapid circumstances. 
The lag between Western and Middle Eastern social movement theory emerges entirely 
as a result of overusing Iran as the primary example of social unrest in the region. Skocpol 
(1982) is one of many scholars who distinguish Iran’s movement as a consequence of rapid 
modernity. While this may have been the case for Iran three decades ago, most Middle Eastern 
countries experienced Western-style economic and social reforms during the 1980s (Bayat, 
2000). If modernity was the primary cause of mobilization, then countries such as Egypt, Libya, 
Lebanon, or Syria would have endured revolutions decades ago. Middle Eastern countries 
experiencing protests today vary tremendously in terms of modernization. Such an explanation 
would, therefore, be inadequate at explaining unrest in the region. 
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Is lam  as  an  Ideo logy  
The second Palestinian intifada and emergence of Hamas as a political power during the 
early 2000s prompted scholars of social movements to focus on Islam as an ideology. The 
movement—triggered by Israel’s prolonged occupation—exposed the violent tactics of Islamist 
movements in the Middle East. While explaining Hamas as a social movement organization 
(SMO), Robinson (2004) scrutinizes the correlation between the group’s Shi’a orientation and 
Hamas’s violent tactics. Narratives of the Shiite holy figure, Hussein ibn Ali, and his sacrifice in 
the name of Islam are often tied to the group’s suicide attacks. When others insist on the political 
pragmatism of Hamas, they fail to remember Islam’s influence over the actions of the group 
(Roy 2003).  In other words, individuals use Islam to explain group violence yet overlook the 
role of Islam when explaining an SMO’s pragmatism. As a consequence, the SMO’s 
relationships with Islam appear to be incoherent. 
Aside from Hamas, a growing library of literature connects Islam to groups solely 
through ideology. Wickham (2002), forming a hybrid of macro and micro approaches, notices: 
In the Muslim world…the most insistent calls for reform have come not from 
movements favoring secular democracy, but from those seeking to establish political 
systems based on Islam. Indeed, Islam has eclipsed secular ideologies as the primary 
source of political activism in much of the Muslim world (1). 
Islam now influences political change more than ever before. The SMOs that have emerged in 
the most recent uprisings in the region have not been overtly Islamist in their demands. In other 
words, these SMOs do not directly seek an Islamic state or impose their Islamic ideologies on the 
greater public.   
Hatem M. Hassan 
7 
 
Rel ig ion and  Socia l  Movem ent  Theory   
A distinct gap exists between the study of religion and social movement theory. Christian 
Smith (1996) cites secularization theory, structural-functionalism, and the lack of inter-discipline 
study between religion and sociology as three factors why religion “has been conspicuously 
under-explored—arguably virtually ignored—in the academic literature on social movements” 
(2). SMOs can tap into religion’s resources without explicitly using its ideologies. Smith uses the 
Civil Rights movement to explain how preachers, because of their acquired skill set, became the 
most influential, and readily available, speakers of the movement. He also includes Poland’s 
Solidarity movement and the Anti-apartheid movement. In all of his examples, religion did not 
play a direct role in the groups’ ideologies or demands. Smith’s work uncovers the positive effect 
that religion can have on a group’s organizational resources.  
Despite his contribution to the study of social movements and religion, Smith’s only 
example of Islam is “the Radical Islamic insurgency in the Iranian revolution” (47). Adding Iran 
to his study provides no novel information regarding the relationship between Islam and social 
movement theory. The Iranian revolution was also primarily Islamist. The initial goal was an 
Islamic theocracy, and the movement was led by Muslim theologians. Demonstrators believed 
that the West had secularized the political and social realms of the country. However, none of the 
demonstrations in 2011 aimed for such a goal. The case of Iran provides little, if any, insight to 
how Islam is present in contemporary Middle Eastern social movements.  
Is lam  and Soc ia l  Movem ent  theory:  an Al ternat ive  
We must begin to understand the role of Islam as a link between an organization’s 
structures, activities, and strategies (Munson 2001), much in the way that Smith (1996) does with 
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other religions. Islam is more than an ideological tool to be used by opposition groups. Political 
pundits and journalists prematurely called the 2011 movements secular because of the public’s 
pro-democratic demands and slogans. Like Christianity in the U.S., Islamic student movements 
in Egypt during the 1970s created a generation of experienced social movement leaders who 
continue to organize both Islamist and non-Islamist movements (Wickham 2011). Consequently, 
Islam may still heavily influence opposition groups and leaders from past generations.  
When cultural frameworks, such as historical values, myths, narratives, and symbols, are 
integrated with ideologies, they provide a better chance for successful mobilization (Goldstone 
2001:154). During the most recent uprising, a similar ideological ‘repackaging’ of SMOs in the 
Middle East may have occurred. Groups are taking individuals who have participated in past 
Islamist movements and are integrating them into new social movements aimed at democracy, 
social justice, and freedom. I do not suggest that the SMOs’ secular demands are fabricated, but 
instead insist on the persisting influence that Islam has on political activism.  
Islam continues to influence Middle Easterners. Men, women, and children perform daily 
religious rituals and practices. Islamic institutions, historical narratives, and other resources 
continue to exist in Muslim communities. Again, the purpose of my study is to identify how 
Islam has permeated into SMOs’ activities, beliefs, and structure in a way that makes Muslims 
comfortable enough to join them. Identifying the specific effects of Islam will allow scholars to 
move away from explanations that link modernization to social unrest in the Middle East. My 
study will also present Islam not only as an ideological source of motivation, but also as a 
provider of organizational resources and an active force that shapes citizen’s day-to-day lives.  
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Methodology 
My study will focus on specific SMOs in the Middle East and not the larger national 
movements. Identifying the relationship between Islam and an organization is only possible if I 
focus on a small number of SMOs. By looking at organizational and leadership structures and the 
relationships an SMO has with political parties, other groups, and institutions, I can identify 
where Islam does and does not exist in today’s Middle Eastern SMOs.  
 The Countr ies  
 Before selecting the SMOs that would be included in my study, I chose the countries 
in which these SMOs would come from. During the early months of 2011, massive 
demonstrations spread throughout the Middle East. In some countries, movements were led by 
established political parties and opposition groups. In other movements, however, formal SMOs 
were less present. I selected countries by looking at a well-known human rights organization, the 
International Crisis Group, and their coverage on the 2011 unrest in the Middle East
2
. In each 
document within the eight-part series, the organization focuses on the countries that went 
through unrest, and provides readers with groups that were involved in the mobilization of 
protestors. Using the report as a guide, I selected Morocco and Egypt as two countries with both 
established and emerging SMOs that were effective at mobilizing individuals during the 2011 
protests. 
 Each country’s unique political and social backgrounds provide the variability needed 
to better understand where exactly Islam fits into an SMO’s functions. For example, Morocco’s 
liberal policies allow Islamist parties, such as the Justice and Development Party, to participate 
                                                 
2
 The International Crisis Group provides an in-depth look at the unrest in the Middle East in their series ‘Popular 
Protest in North Africa and the Middle East’ (2011)  
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in its political realm. This is strikingly different from Egypt, where Islamist political groups 
continue to face repression. In fact, violence in Egyptian protests was relatively high when 
compared to Moroccan demonstrations. Movements within the two countries also differ in their 
consequences. Eighteen days of violent protests in Egypt pressured President Mubarak to resign, 
the National Democratic Party to dismantle, and the parliament to dissolve. The Moroccan 
response, in contrast, included only minor constitutional changes. The variation between 
Morocco and Egypt are significant enough to include them in my comparison.  
The Socia l  Movement  Organiza t ions  
 I then selected the four SMOs that received the highest newspaper coverage in the 
2011 Arab Spring.  I began collecting data from regional, local and international newspapers 
during a period when protests began occurring in more than one major city and no less than three 
times per week. From this point, I selected a four-week time frame for each of the countries, and 
recorded each time an SMO was mentioned during a protest event. I then selected the four 
groups mentioned most by newspapers within the 30-day period.  
 The amount of newspaper coverage a group receives reflects their importance within 
protests and their future political significance. Lipsky (1968: 1151) comments on the importance 
of media coverage for an SMO, stating that “If protest tactics are not considered significant by 
the media, or if newspapers and television reporters or editors decide to overlook protest tactics, 
protest organizations will not succeed.” Because the group’s success is, in part, related to the 
amount of coverage they receive, a simple tally can determine which groups are and will be most 
influential in the future. The most mentioned SMOs were also more likely to have sufficient data 
regarding their organizational structure and relationships with other groups. 
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 After selecting the four groups (see appendix, Table 1.1) I focused on the SMOs 
themselves rather than the protest events. My primary sources included 65 journal articles, 
human rights reports, book sections, dissertations, and government documents, and 400 
newspaper articles. Using the groups’ names as search terms, I selected the first 100 newspaper 
articles for each group. Newspapers included all major world publications available on the 
LexisNexis database. 
The Protocol  
 Once I collected the primary source data, I sorted and analyzed the information in each 
document by using a coding protocol and Atlas.ti, a qualitative analysis tool. The protocol 
consists of 17 different ‘codes,’ or categories (see table 1.2). If I found information that was 
related to a specific category I would link that piece of information to the corresponding code. 
Each piece of information collected is referred to as a quotation. The study included a total of 
2114 quotations across 465 primary documents. 
  The protocol is designed to capture data on the four main elements of SMOs that 
scholars have identified as the most important: (1) organizational structure and leadership, (2) 
recruitment and non-protest activities (3) ideologies, ideas and beliefs, and (4) relationships 
among the group, the state, and other SMOs. The neglect that religion has faced within social 
movement studies (Smith 1996) caused scholars to treat religion as a tool for organizers and a 
source of motivation for their followers (Goldstone 2001). By looking at each SMO’s functions 
and their relationship to Islam I hope to move away from the simplistic view that religion is only 
present within a group’s ideology. For this particular paper, I choose to focus on the two most 
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revealing functions of an SMO: its organizational and leadership structures and its relationship 
with other groups. 
O r ga n i z a t i on a l  a nd  L ea ders h i p  S t r u c tu r es  
 The ways in which leaders make decisions and structure their group can be based off 
of Islamic ideas. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood’s three-step process to becoming a member 
involved a gradual commitment to the group’s beliefs, while simultaneously isolating each 
member from the rest of society to incubate those ideas (Munson 2001).  Only glimpses of the 
group’s ideas were represented to initial recruits, while key members had to be fully immersed 
within it. Another example of an Islam-influenced organizational structure would be Hezbollah’s 
12-member Majlis al-Shura council, which consists of respected clerics who make the tactical 
decisions for the group. Similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah leaders must be well-
educated in the teachings of the Q’uran as they move towards leadership positions. Some groups 
may use Islam as both an intellectual and social standard when organizing their structures, while 
other groups may use a political model (coordination committees, presidents, etc.). 
R e la t io ns h i ps  w i t h  O t her  Gr ou ps  
 An SMO’s relationships between other groups, institutions, and political parties affect 
its members’ experiences. Groups that have joint meetings, participate in one another’s protests, 
or provide each other with monetary support may allow members to draw from resources across 
groups. Islamic rituals and practices are two resources that an SMO could provide. For example, 
if an Islamist group cooperates with a left-wing secular SMO during protests by providing any 
religious necessities, the left-wing SMO need not incorporate those aspects of Islam into its 
structure. By providing these essential services, the non-Islamist SMO may redirect its resources 
towards other activities while the religious groups provide members with familiar Islamic rituals. 
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This would allow individuals to participate in familiar religious activities during times of unrest 
and still join groups that don’t include Islam within its structure.    
 With an outline of my methods, as well as an in-depth look at the protocol, I will now 
address two possible critiques of my study: choosing newspapers as a primary data source, and 
examining a small number of SMOs. 
Newspapers  as  a  Prim ary Data  Source  
 Out of the six primary sources mentioned, newspaper data collection has been the 
most heavily criticized by social movement scholars. Sarah Soule and Jennifer Earl (2004) have 
cited the two most common issues when selecting newspapers: selection and description bias. 
Both authors conclude that selection bias poses a larger problem because of the way news 
agencies select and describe the events covered (69). Hoping to mitigate some of the errors from 
selection bias, I selected all English newspapers available on the Lexis Nexis database.  This 
approach, the triangulation of sources, has been used effectively in past research (Koopmans & 
Rucht 2002) to cover more news events and reduce selection bias. Local newspapers may report 
more on the individual organizations, while international and regional newspapers focus on 
larger protests. On the one hand, redundancy of the events covered did occur. On the other hand, 
it provided exactly the type of legitimacy that was desired for the study. 
 Additional criticism has been cited (Melucci 1994, Earl et. al. 2004) on what the 
researcher aims to collect from newspapers. Earl argues that the organizational dynamics of a 
group, such as its structure and recruitment, “might be better addressed with other types of data" 
(Earl et al. 2004: 76). However, this study differs in two ways. Unlike much of the research 
using newspapers (McAdam & Su 2002, Rucht & Ohlemacher 1992), mine examined protests 
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that occur outside of the U.S. Because the SMOs in my study came from highly repressive 
countries, limited information about each group was available prior to the current uprisings. As a 
result, newspaper data made up for the lack of scholarly articles written about such groups. 
Second, research focused not on the protest events themselves, but the activities of SMOs 
involved before, during, and after these events. Because the search terms primarily pertain to 
SMO names and leaders, rather than dates of protests, different results emerged.  
Sm all -N  versus  Big -N 
  The battle between a small versus large number of case studies is heavily debated 
(Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 2003). Even so, research containing relatively few case studies has 
heavily influenced work on social movements and revolutions (Earl 2003, Goodwin 2001, Parsa 
2000, Skocpol 1979).  In both big and small studies, trade-offs related to deterministic and 
probabilistic causal inferences are often made. Because my methodology only contains a total of 
four SMOs across two countries, I consider my approach to be a small-N study. Consequently, 
making the causal inference that Islam has any effect on an organization’s structure, activities, or 
ideas excludes other independent factors that may be involved.   
 Lieberson (1991) criticized the small-N approach, by pointing out its inability to allow 
for deterministic or probabilistic causal inferences. In order for small-N studies to be 
theoretically sound, Lieberson argues, a study’s method must include “existence of only one 
cause” and “confidence that all possible causes are measured” (315). Using a diverse group of 
SMOs from different Muslim countries has eliminated some of the other factors affecting 
mobilization. More importantly, Lieberson’s criticism applies more to deductive studies, such as 
Skocpol’s (1979) well known work on revolutions. Within her study, she hypothesizes that 
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certain structural elements must be present in order for a revolution to occur. My study, however, 
was more inductive in nature. I make no generalizations or overarching hypotheses about the 
groups at the beginning of the study. Nor do I suggest a definite relationship between Islam and 
the SMO, on the one hand, and the probability of group success on the other. In a small-N study 
that does not set out to provide universal hypotheses, Lieberson’s argument holds little 
relevance. 
 Lieberson is primarily concerned with studies that infer causality. Again, I make no 
claim of an SMO’s success or failure based on the supposed relationship between Islam and a 
group’s functions. Rather, I focus on how the relationship itself is created. Whether a group’s 
relationship with Islam subsequently benefits or harms it remains, at most, a secondary purpose 
of my study.  
After collecting 400 newspaper articles, as well as 65 other primary sources, I used a 
qualitative analysis tool, Atlas.ti, to code the data according to the 17 codes from the protocol. I 
do not suggest that these codes, and the functions that they represent, are more important than the 
others. Rather, it indicates the type of information that is most accessible within these groups. It 
also represents the information most important to the media. 
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Results 
I now turn to an analysis of the data I collected in each of the two areas considered important 
to SMOs—(1) organizational and leadership structures and (2) relationships with SMOs, political 
parties, and institutions. My original study included two additional sections: (3) ideologies, ideas, 
and beliefs of an SMO, and (4) recruitment and non-protest activities. In this paper, however, I 
have chosen to highlight the two sections most relevant to my research question. 
1.  Organiza t ional  and Leadership  S truc tures  
My analysis for this section is based on 416 pieces of information I collected on the structure 
and leadership of the four SMOs that comprise this study (see Table 1.3a). 
Organizational Structure  
The biggest contrast between the Islamist and non-Islamist SMOs can be seen in their 
organizational structures. Kefaya and the F20M were formed as coalitions (see table 1.5) with 
quasi-independent local committees. Their decentralized structures integrate the ideological 
flexibility of different regions. The Brotherhood and Al Adl’s rigid structures, in contrast, make 
clear distinctions between their religious and political arms.  
D ecen t ra l i z ed  S t r uc t ur es  a nd  t h e  N on- I s l a mis t s  
Non-Islamist groups are characterized as leaderless and structureless in 16 different 
quotations. A member of the Moroccan Coalition for Parliamentary Monarchy suggests “that the 
[February 20
th
] movement suffers from weak organization.”3 Yet, out of the 16 quotations, only 
one fails to go beyond the ‘leaderless’ explanation.  
                                                 
3
 For Morocco’s February 20 reform movement, new constitution means rebirth. (2011, July 6).The National, p. 3. 
Rabat. 
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In reality, the groups appear to be structured on a small scale with general guidance from 
national coordinating committees.
4
 The F20M is nationally led by a support council but locally 
organized through quasi-independent committees (Roko 2011). Similarly, Kefaya consists of an 
inner circle of 35 members responsible for handling research and financial matters. Its structure 
also includes advisory and coordinating committees that organize day-to-day activities (Oweidat 
et al. 2008). Although the groups’ structures are certainly loose, they are neither leaderless nor 
formless. In fact, the dynamic structures illustrate both groups’ ability to adapt to an 
ideologically diverse community. 
 Labeling these groups as ‘leaderless’ implies a negative connotation that ignores their 
structural flexibilities. The Creation of local subcommittees responsible for day-to-day activities 
provides local communities with chances to voice their demands and beliefs. To incorporate 
diverse populations into their movements, both SMOs had to create a structure that would meet 
the needs of their changing environments. The early Muslim Brotherhood’s structure was similar 
in its flexibility. Munson (2001: 498) explains how “industrial workers in the Shubra al-Khayma 
district of Cairo… had little in common with the traditional Egyptian peasants…The Muslim 
Brotherhood’s federated structure allowed it to appeal to the parochial orientations of different 
groups and different regions of Egypt.”  The Egyptian Brotherhood was concerned about the 
ideological and socioeconomic differences across Egypt. These differences continue to exist 
today. By creating loose coalitions and independent subcommittees led by national advisory 
boards, Kefaya and the F20M are able to project their general demands without excluding 
potential Islamist, socialist, Marxist, Nasserite, or liberal members.  
                                                 
4
 British Broadcasting Corporation. (2011, October 4). Young Moroccan protesters vow to continue action against 
corruption. BBC Monitoring Middle East, p. 2. Casablanca.  
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R ig id  S t ru c tur e s :  Sep ar a t i ng  t h e  R e l i g i ou s  an d  Po l i t i ca l  
 In sharp contrast to the non-Islamists, Al Adl and the Muslim Brotherhood created 
distinct arms that carried out separate functions. Al Adl’s structure consists of a political and 
spiritual arm, and is led by a Murshid, a Sufi term meaning ‘guide’ or ‘leader’ (Maddy-
Weitzman 2003). According to Ottaway and Riley (2006), Al Adl’s Majlis al Shura “provides 
the political and organizational direction of the movement,” while the Majlis al Irchad “provides 
spiritual or ideological guidance” (16). The Brotherhood’s structure, although still highly 
secretive, consists of a 16-member Guidance Office (religious council), a political wing, and a 
charity division (Hamzawy and Brown 2010). The group’s political arm, referred to as the 
parliamentary bloc, addresses government reform issues, while the General Guide and the 
Guidance Office controls social and religious activities (Hamzawy and Brown 2010: 29). As the 
Brotherhood gained power in the 2005 elections, it created an addition to its political wing 
known as the “parliamentary kitchen.” The wing acts as a think tank, gathering data pertaining to 
local economic issues (Shehata 2006). Al Adl and the Brotherhood separate the political 
functions of their organizations from the spiritual ones. Older leaders in each group initially 
considered the religious arm as the highest authority; however, as younger members led the 
groups toward the political realm, they began to critique the authoritative structure that had been 
created by the old guard.  
Leadership 
 The origins and decision-making process of a group can reveal much about an SMO’s 
ideology, structure, and other functions. Authoritative figures are being replaced with realistic 
leaders that reflect each group’s changing beliefs. The ideological debates between young and 
old members of the four groups reveal the emergence of a new, pragmatic generation of leaders.  
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A ut ho r i t a t i v e  S t ru c t ur e s  
While non-Islamists were demanding change within the government, the Islamist SMOs 
were busy disputing internal reforms, generational gaps, and beliefs. Between Al Adl and the 
Brotherhood, 31 quotations collected on the leadership structures focused on polarization among 
leaders. This divide emerged from debates over authority. Founding members of both groups 
privilege religious power over all others, and prefer a more authoritative approach. Younger 
members, on the other hand, argue for more consensus-based approach to decision-making. 
The religious legitimacy of Al Adl’s leader, Yassine, allowed him to be successful and 
authoritative in style. Bahaji (2011: 44) describes Yassine’s role as the religious leader of Al 
Adl: “the murshid holds supreme rule, followers of the base have no decision making powers… 
[The murshid] also has right to make emergency executive decisions without orientation 
counsel.” According to Sufi ideology, the murshid is a sacred authority that cannot be questioned 
by members of a lower rank. “The organization[al] nature of Al Adl Wal Ihsan is based on the 
belief in a ‘sacrosanct’ status of its leader and his religious attributes.”5 To disagree with Yassine 
would be to question the legitimacy of the murshid. Because most Al Adl members consider 
themselves religious, they are forced to obey the murshid and his rigid decision-making process.  
 The Brotherhood struggles with internal factions due to the General Guide’s power over 
both the political and religious arms of the group. Despite the separation of the two arms, many 
young and moderate Brotherhood leaders have begun to resist the old guard. Stacher (2002) 
unveils one of the potential causes of factionalism: “by concentrating power in the hands of 
approximately ten senior decision-makers, the Brotherhood alienated other prominent and 
                                                 
5
 Moroccan daily accuses Islamists of taking control of reformist movement. (2011, May 27).BBC Monitoring 
Middle East - Political, p. 1. Casablanca. 
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politicized members, such as Wasat founder Abu Ala-Madi” (420). The General Guide, the 
highest authority in the group, struggled when younger leaders of the Brotherhood began to 
desire political participation. The General Guide’s power within the organization may have 
worked for the original Brotherhood structure, which was exclusively involved in social services. 
Factionalism became rampant once the group formed their political wing.  
G en er a t io na l  Ga ps  
 The Brotherhood’s leadership polarization can also be explained by the generational gap 
among members. Three generations of leaders can be identified based on their historical and 
ideological differences: the old guard, pragmatic conservatives, and reformists (Wickham 2011).  
The old guard, or the Da’wa faction, experienced repression under Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
Egypt’s first president (Zahid 2010). They are “generally more zealous and conservative, and 
were committed primarily to long-term spiritual work and to preserving the movement’s unity” 
(91), and are “strongly represented in the Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau and local branch 
offices” (209). Additionally, past experiences made the group “deeply suspicious of other groups 
and unforgiving toward former political rivals such as the Nasserists, Arab nationalists, and 
Marxists”  (Elad-Altman 2006: 26). The old guard is close to Islam not only in ideology, but also 
in its opposition to non-Islamist political parties. Younger generations are more ideologically 
flexible and willing to work with secular parties. 
Members of the second faction, referred to as ‘pragmatic conservatives,’ are distinct from 
the old guard because they “combine religious conservatism with a belief in the value of 
participation and engagement… [and] are willing to cooperate with secular groups in pursuit of 
common goals” (210).  This group emerged in the 1980s and gave the Brotherhood its 
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motivation to enter the political realm. The pragmatic conservatives consist mostly of individuals 
with legislative experiences.  
The new generation of leaders that emerged during the 1990s is the most ideologically 
distant from the old guard. The “reformist” faction “calls for democratic reform of the Egyptian 
state and the democratic reform of the Muslim Brotherhood itself” (210).  They criticize the 
authority given to the Guidance Bureau and Supreme Guide and promote the inclusion of Coptic 
Christians and women into the Brotherhood’s leadership structure. Unlike the former two 
factions, the reformers believe that Islamic authority should not be the final word in the group’s 
decision-making process. 
Al Adl and the Muslim Brotherhood’s original leadership structure considered Islamic 
figures as the highest authorities. As new leaders became politically active, divisions between the 
old and new guards emerged. The young members are leading both groups to adopt a more 
democratic decision-making process. Essam el-Erian, a senior leader of the Brotherhood, 
expresses this emerging view when he asserts, “it's time for solidarity! It’s time for unity; in my 
opinion we need a national consensus”6. From the youths’ perspective, internal divisions can be 
avoided by the inclusion of all group members in the decision-making process.  
For the non-Islamist group Kefaya, the question who makes the decision reveals more 
about the group’s historical and religious roots than the question how are decisions made. 
George Ishaq, a Coptic Christian, and Magdy Hussein were both members of the Islamist 
political party, Hizb al-Amal before forming Kefaya (Shorbagy 2007). Another founding 
member, Abdel Gelil Moustafa, was a former Brotherhood member and founder of the moderate 
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 KIRKPATRICK, D. D., & GOODMAN, J. D. (2011, February 16). Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to Be Political 
Party. The New York Times, p. 2. Cairo/New York. 
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Islamist group Al-Wasat.
7
 The two journalists in the group, Abdel Wahab El Messiry and Abdel 
Halim Qandeel, are experts on the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the latter of which is heavily influenced 
by Gamal Abdel Nasser.
8
 Islamist or not, Kefaya’s historical connection to the 1970s student 
movements clarifies why the unification of Islamists, leftists, Marxists, and Nasserites is 
possible. 
Membership Demographics  
 The socioeconomic backgrounds of each of the four SMOs differ significantly. Twenty-
seven percent of the data I collected on the four groups’ membership demographics referred to 
socioeconomic backgrounds when discussing their members. Al Adl is the only group that 
recruits its members primarily from lower socioeconomic statuses. The other three SMOs have 
gained their support from middle class professionals, intellectuals, and political elites.  
R ecru i t i ng  th e  P oor  
 Al Adl, unlike the other three groups, recruits its members from the lower socioeconomic 
strata of society. Daadaoui (2008: 229) points out that Al Adl “is increasingly gaining followers 
in the shantytowns in Tangiers, Rabat, Marrakech and Casablanca.” Instead of taking advantage 
of middle class professionals in large, industrialized cities, Al Adl consciously focuses on the 
poorest members of society. Even its newest members emerge from the “growing number of… 
educated young people unable to find work” (Yildirim 2010: 355). Al Adl is primarily interested 
in recruiting from a lower socioeconomic status. Literally translating to “Justice and Charity,” Al 
Adl gains influence among the poor partly because of its Islam-inspired social services. 
                                                 
7
 Kefaya coordinator retains seat for another year. (2010, January 14).Daily News Egypt, p. 2. Cairo. 
8
 Kefaya regroups with new Coalition for Change. (2009, January 21).Daily News Egypt, p. 3. Cairo. 
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U p p er  a nd  M id d l e  C l as s  Pr o f es s i on a l s  
The Brotherhood, Kefaya, and the F20M recruit among middle and upper class 
intellectuals, professionals, and political elites. According to Al Jazeera, the F20M includes 
“participants across various sectors of society, from trade unions to Berber rights to human rights 
groups.”9 Similarly, the two Egyptian groups have almost exclusively focused on the upper and 
middle classes. Ahmad Hamad, executive director of the pro-democracy Hisham Mubarak Law 
Center, indicates that Kefaya “is mainly supported by the political elite. You can't say that it has 
gained any foothold among the wider masses."
10
 Zahid (2010) explains the change in the 
Brotherhood’s demographics as it gained support in syndicates. In both groups, recruiting from 
the middle and upper classes appears to be more appealing than Al Adl’s approach. Still, this 
does not suggest that the members of these groups come from a secular segment of society. 
 Cross-class alliances within Egyptian communities can help make sense of Kefaya and 
the Brotherhood’s membership demographics. Individuals who are from middle and upper-
classes hold a variety of professions and have access to different resources. Clarke (2004) points 
to Islamic medical clinics in Cairo as one way that middle and upper-class professionals have 
been brought together. Regardless of their individual ideological views, Clark notes that “they 
are indeed part of a larger Islamist phenomenon, connected to it via their ties to the boards of 
directors. They become part of and have access to the growing horizontal Islamist networks” 
(965). She insists that secular doctors and rich donors can be part of a “larger Islamist 
phenomenon” precisely because they are brought together through Islamic medical clinics. The 
Brotherhood and Kefaya do not gain their support from this specific network, but may have 
                                                 
9
 Al-Jazeera reports Moroccan protests following referendum on constitution. (2011, July 5).BBC Monitoring 
Middle East, p. 3. Rabat. 
10
 Wilson, S., & Williams, D. (2005, April 17). A New Power Rises Across Mideast; Advocates for Democracy 
Begin to Taste Success After Years of Fruitless Effort. The Washington Post, p. 6. Beirut. 
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access to similar “Islamic networks” where politicians, doctors, lawyers, and engineers are 
brought together through Islamic institutions. 
Means of Communication 
 Blogs, social networking websites, online group-sponsored newspapers, and YouTube 
videos have become extremely important tools for communication among the four SMOs. For 
the Brotherhood, the internet gives underrepresented members room to disagree with their 
leaders without risking direct confrontations. It also provides all groups with a chance to avoid 
state repression. 
T h e  In t ern e t  a s  a n  A r en a  fo r  Di s s en t  
Brotherhood blogging and Facebook usage facilitate “both the debate between 
generations within the Muslim Brotherhood and also the geographic debate between 
Brotherhood bloggers in different regions” (8). Similarly, women “through blogging and other 
internet communication tools… found a new avenue to express themselves and have their 
experiences heard” (Darlene 2011:75). Female members and young members, both ignored by 
the old guard, may now openly voice their opinions and gain power within the Brotherhood by 
utilizing online resources. These members often bring up the ideological difference of the group. 
Ajemian (2008: 6) observes that “blogging has enabled moderate Muslim Brothers, like Abdel 
Monem Mahmoud, to publicly critique policies set forth by the group’s more conservative 
leadership.” The anonymity provided by online tools preserved the Brotherhood’s organization 
while slowly introducing the group to moderate ideas of Islam. The same anonymity that gives 
younger members a safe place to express liberal ideological views also shelters Brotherhood 
members from state repression.  
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T h e  In t ern e t  a s  a  Sa f e  Ha ven  
 All four SMOs use the internet as a means of communication to circumvent highly 
repressive regimes. Isherwood (2008) describes the Brotherhood’s choice to begin this type of 
communication: “over the course of 2005 and 2006, the state took action in 
universities…preventing them from standing for student government positions and preventing 
many from graduating. This restriction of political space in universities drove many young 
Muslim Brotherhood members online to blogging” (5). The internet provides a safe haven for 
Brotherhood members to express opinions without being harassed. Whereas Islamists once relied 
on mosques and universities for protection, they now depend on the anonymity of the internet.  
Trends in Organizational and Leadership Structures  
 Organizational and leadership structures of the four SMOs are constantly adapting to 
changing environments. Islamist groups traditionally set up hierarchal structures based off of 
religious authority.
11
 Those who were considered most knowledgeable in Islam were also the 
ones making the groups’ decisions. The leaders were authoritarian in their style and dissent was 
unwelcome. Al Adl is the strongest representation of this traditionally Islamic structure among 
the four SMOs. 
 Yet, the data reveals that Al Adl and the Brotherhood’s traditional structures quickly 
failed. Changes in their environments caused ideological differences among members. Their first 
attempt at adaptation was the division of their organizations into political and religious arms. 
                                                 
11
 I use the term ‘traditional’ to describe the type of structure that was used by the early Brotherhood, Hamas, and 
theocratic states, such as Iran, which make up modern Western perceptions of Islamist groups and states. For more 
about Hamas and their Brotherhood origins see: Abu-Amr, Ziad. “A Historical and Political Background.” Journal 
of Palestine Studies 22, no. 4 (1993): 5–19; and Robinson, Glenn E. “Hamas as Social Movement.” In Islamic 
Activism: a Social Movement Theory Approach, by Quintan Wiktorowicz. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, 2004.  To see more about the role and power of religious clerics in Iran see: Arjomand, S. A. 
(1989). The turban for the crown: the Islamic revolution in Iran. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
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Polarization within both SMOs became rampant, since the structural split represented a larger 
ideological division between religiously conservative and moderate leaders. Due to its rigid 
structure and authoritative leadership, Al Adl was negatively impacted once Yassine was 
arrested (Bahaji 2011). The Brotherhood, on the other hand, went through a trial-and-error 
process. After a series of splinter groups, including the moderate Islamist Al-Wasat party, the 
Brotherhood changed its structure. Ideological battles through blogs, YouTube videos, and other 
online means of communication introduced the group to its members’ diverse beliefs. The 
Brotherhood began recruiting members from politically active middle and upper-class segments 
of Egypt. The group understood that changes in the traditional structure were necessary if the 
group was to continue its influence over the Egyptian people. 
 Kefaya and the F20M were born from the trial-and-error processes of Islamist groups. 
While the media mistakenly view their structure as leaderless and amorphous, the groups 
strategically structure themselves to be ideologically flexible. Leaders are Islamic, liberal, and 
socialist in their historical roots. Similarly, members come from all economic sectors of society, 
and use various technologies to share their beliefs.  Coalition-style structures prepare the two 
SMOs for their environmental changes. 
 Islam is present in all four groups due to the large populations of devout Muslims in 
Egypt and Morocco. However, the two countries are ideologically diverse and demographically 
heterogeneous. The SMOs that are destined to survive are those that open up their structures to 
include devout Muslims, liberals, socialists, and other politically motivated members of 
societies. Traditional authoritative structures are incompatible with increasingly diverse SMOs. 
Islamist groups that fail to mimic their environments’ pluralism will be riddled with factionalism 
and will have difficulty in mobilizing a large population.  
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2.  Relat ionships  wi th  Other  Groups  
For the final section, I collected 638 pieces of information on the four groups’ relationships 
with other SMOs, political parties, and institutions (see Table 1.3d).  
Relationships with SMOs 
Recruiting members and gaining political influence motivates SMOs to create alliances 
and rivalries among other groups. During February 2011, both Al Adl and the F20M participated 
in and supported each other at protest events. Kefaya and the Muslim Brotherhood have also 
demonstrated their willingness to cooperate since 2005. Yet, relationships between Islamist and 
non-Islamist SMOs in both countries are often marked by indecisiveness. In part, this is due to 
their mutual fears of ideological compromise.   
A l  Ad l  an d  th e  F 20M  
Al Adl and the F20M’s early relationship was mutually supportive. The Islamist group 
joined the coalition in the initial stages of the 2011 protests "in the belief that its demand for an 
end to repression and corruption represents a popular demand.”12 The vague goals—of ending 
the regime’s unjust practices—initially caused the two ideologically different groups to join 
forces. On one occasion, Al Adl commemorated “New Hegira Day [Islamic New Year] by 
distributing balloons to children, and milk, dates and sweets to participants in the march…the 
group chose to install a loudspeaker…and called for the release of the [dissident] rapper Mouadh 
El Haked.”13 The Islamist group supported the F20M through its rhetoric and provided it with 
resources for demonstrations. A prominent F20M activist, Abdallah Amin, adds that “the 
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 Moroccan Islamist group ends participation in protest movement. (2011, December 20).BBC Monitoring Middle 
East, p. 1. Doha. 
13
 Radhif, I. (2011, November 29). Moroccan protest movement reportedly questions fairness of 25 Nov poll. BBC 
Monitoring Middle East, p. 2. Casablanca. 
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Islamists were useful to the February 20 Movement, because their cadres were well disciplined, 
and they could provide a sizable pool of rank-and-file in order to throng the streets and add 
significance to the contention” (Roko 2011: 106). Sharing the same willingness to cooperate, the 
F20M mentioned Al Adl’s membership pool as the primary incentive for including the group in 
its coalition. As long as their goals remained vague enough, the groups would be able to continue 
their positive relationship. 
 As the Moroccan government implemented constitutional reforms, Al Adl and the F20M 
began disputing their specific demands. Al Adl’s spokesman Hassan Bennajeh gives his account 
of the disagreement, stating “at the beginning of the demonstrations, we agreed with the demands 
for the end to despotism and corruption…With time, we found many elements want to impose 
the parliamentary monarchy as a limit. We do not agree."
14
 Because Al Adl refuses to recognize 
the king as a figure head, they clashed with F20M activists who once shouted “we love our 
country, we love our king, but we are against corruption and economic and political 
monopoly."
15
 Conflicts over specific demands began to polarize the two groups ideologically. 
Almost a year after their mutual protests, Al Adl left the F20M, “because it [had] already 
achieved all it could possibly do,” claiming that they were now “looking for broader means to 
make [their] demands heard." 
16
 Despite access to each other’s members and their mutual dislike 
for corruption and despotism, Al Adl and F20M were unable to overcome their ideological 
differences. 
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 Schemm, P. (2011, December 19). Morocco’s Islamist movement leaves reform group. Associated Press, p. 2. 
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T h e  Mu s l i m  B ro t h er ho od  a nd  K e f a ya  
 Unlike the Moroccan groups, Kefaya and the Muslim Brotherhood have sustained a 
relationship since 2005, beginning with their cooperation at the pro-Gaza demonstrations. During 
2009, a European aid convoy destined for Palestinians in Gaza arrived on Egyptian soil. The 
Daily News Egypt reported that “the Kefaya movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, [and] the 
unofficial Al-Karama party, are planning a public reception at all of [the] convoy’s stops.” 17 In 
an interview with the head of the Brotherhood’s parliamentary bloc, Saad El-Katatny stressed 
that the “currents have never seen eye to eye as much as they do regarding the lifting of the 
blockade from Gaza and supporting the Palestinian people."
18
 The Palestinian conflict was often 
a rallying point for the two groups, allowing them to share beliefs and organizational demands 
during protests.
19
 
 When Palestine was not the issue, the Egyptian SMOs were more careful to accept each 
other’s ideologies. Kefaya always had a willingness to work with the Islamist group “provided 
the Brotherhood behaves like a political and not a religious organization” (Sahgal 2008: 102). 
They supported an alliance with the Brotherhood as long as they maintained their ideological 
flexibility. Similarly, the Brotherhood spokesperson, Ali Abdel Fattah, said that the group wants 
alliances "with whoever will be willing to hold our hands."
20
 Another member told the 
Washington Post that the “Brotherhood wants what Kifaya and others want: free and fair 
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 Opposition forces to welcome European aid convoy. (2009, March 2).Daily News Egypt, p. 1. CAIRO. 
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 Ibid. 
19
 Shadid, A. (2007, March 18). Imagining Otherwise In Egypt; Opposition Campaign Embodying Bush Vision Now 
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elections.”21 Like the Moroccan groups, Kefaya and the Brotherhood’s supported each other’s 
broad demands. Ideological differences led to separate demands, and eventually caused the two 
groups to distance themselves from each other.  
 The negative relationship between Kefaya and the Brotherhood began with their political 
demands against the Mubarak Regime. One blogger described the dispute as: 
more on the issue of hereditary rule than [a] religious issue. While Kifaya had 
expressed complete opposition to Mubarak and his son Gamal, Muslim 
Brotherhood members had claimed that as long as emergency rule was lifted they 
would accept either of the two as the president (Sahgal, 2008: 162).  
Kefaya’s original demand of an end to the Mubarak regime was non-negotiable, and became a 
point of division between the two groups. Brotherhood members “focused their critique of 
Kefaya on its ‘vulgar’ slogans, perceived as ‘insulting’ the president of the republic"(Shorbagy 
2007: 189). Kefaya retaliated, stating "the Brotherhood is like an enormous body with a very 
small brain. It takes time to get it moving…They don’t want to miss out.”22 Tactics of 
intimidation, initiated by differences in demands, began to split the groups. 
 Even during 2011, the Brotherhood continued its ambivalence towards other groups. One 
report describes the Brotherhood indecisiveness by describing their "flurry of mixed 
messages…they refused to collectively back the protesters… they condoned individual members 
to march. Two days later, the Brotherhood called out all of its membership onto the streets. Now 
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 Shadid, A. (2005, July 21). Anatomy of a Protest: In Cairo, One Camp Is Soon Two; Religious, Secular Groups 
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they want an official role in any new government."
23
 The ambiguity between Islamists and non-
Islamist is, in part, due to the specificity of their demands and exposure to different ideologies. 
But conflicts between groups also emerge as a result of the symbolic tactics of the regime. 
Relationship with Islamic Institutions  and the State 
 The Moroccan and Egyptian regimes have used Islam to delegitimize Al Adl and the 
Brotherhood, respectively. Government officials use their rhetoric and affiliations with Islamic 
clerics and institutions to claim moral superiority over Islamist SMOs. I recorded 54 accounts of 
the symbolic battle between the state and Islamist groups. In Morocco, Al Adl is largely 
delegitimized by the regime’s claim over religious authority. In Egypt, however, the Brotherhood 
seems to be doing the reverse. The battle between SMOs and the government are determined by 
how each side frame’s Islam and the connections that religious figures have to the government. 
A l  Ad l  v er su s  t h e  M o ro ccan  S t a t e  
 According to Moroccan law, the king is recognized as Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of 
the Faithful), giving him ultimate religious authority. Yildirim (2010) suggests that the title’s 
“perceived control of the religious space in the country dominates the religious discourse in 
Morocco” (295). The religious sacredness of the Moroccan state has caused the general public to 
denounce alternative political solutions proposed by Islamist groups. 
The Moroccan government has also fostered relationships with religious elite, which are 
“characterized by… [their] utter submission to the interests of the state” (Daadaoui 2008: 217). 
Religious authorities are hired by the state, and occupy positions, such as “religious city 
councils, grand Muftis and [become part of the] religious establishment of the ‘ulama” (216). 
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Holding official positions in the Moroccan government, religious authorities provide the state 
with a level of symbolic and religious significance. When Islamist SMOs challenge the state’s 
legitimacy, they are attacked on religious grounds. 
 The connections formed between the state and religious authority became useful when 
Yassine, Al Adl’s leader, began mobilizing against the king. As a response, "the state Ministry 
for Religious Affairs made the official league of ‘Ulama’ denounce [him]" (231). The state’s 
arrest of Al Adl’s leader and religious guide, Yassine, caused the group to lose political and 
religious legitimacy. Al Ad insists that the “one of the biggest impediments to their social 
mobilization and overall societal appeal is deeply held…belief [of the] regime’s traditional 
legitimacy and its attendant rituals of power” (Daadaoui 2008: 224). The state’s use of Islam 
makes it difficult for any anti-regime Islamist group to succeed. 
T h e  Rever ed  B ro t he r ho od  a nd  t h e  Mub ar a k  R eg im e  
 The Brotherhood’s religious battle against the state often benefits the group. For example, 
after the Brotherhood’s condemnation of Egypt’s involvement in the 1991 Iraq war, the regime 
responded by calling Egypt an Islamic rather than secular state (Zahid 2011: 116). In other cases, 
the Brotherhood’s legitimacy and power relies on its sheer size. For example, the group gained 
legitimacy after taking over government social services during the 1992 Earthquake.
 24
 This was 
one of the reasons for its 2005 electoral success (Pioppi 2011). The Egyptian government 
realized that it would be difficult to take religious authority away from the Brotherhood. Instead, 
they rely “on religious justifications, oppress secular or liberal opponents, and nourish 
obscurantist religious trends within Al-Azhar” (Antar 2006:12). Conscious of the religious and 
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political influence of the Brotherhood, the Mubarak Regime was careful to use Islamic frames 
against the group.  
 In fact, the Brotherhood is often the one delegitimizing the government’s actions through 
a religious framework. In 2002, the organization accused the Mubarak regime of undermining Al 
Azhar, one of the oldest religiously-affiliated academic institutions in the world. They claimed 
that such actions would “de-emphasize religion and [the] Arabic language in the school 
curriculum” (Hamzawy and Brown 2010: 25). Later in 2006, the Brotherhood attacked the 
Ministry of Culture after its criticism the Islamic hijab (veil). They insisted that such attacks 
were “not simply against the Brotherhood or Islamists, but against the entire Islamic nation” 
(Oweidat et al. 2008: 33). By framing the incident as an attack towards Islam as a whole rather 
than against a specific religious institution, the Brotherhood gained support of the wider 
Egyptian Muslim population. A similar framework was used when the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs tried to ban demonstrations within mosques in 2008. The group accused the state of 
trying to “reduce spaces available for free expression under the pretext of protecting places of 
worship” (Hamzawy and Brown 2010: 21). Unlike Al Adl, the Brotherhood was attacking the 
government for threatening Islam’s daily practices and rituals.  
Relationship with Political Parties  
 All four SMOs distance themselves from Islamist political parties. For the Brotherhood, 
Kefaya is simply too young and has not experienced the hardships of being an Islamist SMO. 
Even Al Adl and the Brotherhood distance themselves from other Islamists on ideological 
grounds. 
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 Kefaya’s entrance into the Egyptian political realm after the Brotherhood’s 2005 electoral 
success stirred fear among older political parties. According to one analysis, “older, more-
established parties also did not want Kefaya to take credit for a success they wished to claim as 
the fruit of their long struggle” (Oweidat et al. 2008: 38). In the Brotherhood’s opinion, the 
group had not earned their political legitimacy through years of government repression. 
Likewise, the F20M faces similar opposition from older political parties. Many of the younger 
members of well-established political groups, such as the Islamist Justice and Development 
party, “joined in without official blessings [from their] parent organizations.”25 Political parties 
were more concerned with young groups not paying ‘the dues’ that older parties had.  
 Al Adl and the Brotherhood’s distance from Islamist groups is due to ideological 
differences. Al-Wasat, the Brotherhood’s political splinter group, emerged precisely because its 
moderate views of Islam (Stacher 2002). Similarly, Al Adl opposes the Islamist Justice and 
Development party’s political alliance with the state and rebukes it acceptance of the regime as a 
legitimate representative of Islam (Yildirim 2010). Debates between political participation and 
the role of Islam divide these groups and make Al Adl and the Brotherhood generally hostile 
against other Islamist groups. 
Trends in Relationships with Other Groups  
 The relationship between SMOs and other groups are always in flux. Al Adl had some 
success in mobilization when it cooperated with the F20M. Still, the group has been 
systematically delegitimized by the Moroccan government, ignored by the Islamist Justice and 
Development Party, and attacked by pro-democracy movements. The Brotherhood, in contrast, 
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has enjoyed religious legitimacy over government institutions. Despite their influence, the group 
risks compromising its beliefs in order to meet the ideological flexibility of Kefaya.  The result is 
a flurry of political splinter groups beginning with Al-Wasat.  
 Non-Islamists also share an ever-changing relationship with Muslim groups. Kefaya and 
the F20M are able to build coalitions across extremely diverse political and religious ideologies. 
Nevertheless, as demands become specific, they tend to part with most Islamists. At times, the 
groups belittle their Muslim counterparts for being overly conservative. In other instances, they 
try to tap into Islamists’ large network of support.  
 The SMOs are consciously responding to Islamic groups and institutions in order to gain 
political power. Whether SMOs agree on the specific demands or not, their desire for social 
change has kept this dynamic going. 
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Conclusion 
In presenting my results, I have attempted to demonstrate how the relationship between 
Islam and SMOs has largely been underexplored. Speaking about Islam in social movement 
theory involves more than a simple analysis of doctrine. Various interpretations of the religion 
by liberals, moderates, and conservatives restrict SMO leaders from using it as a tool. Islam is 
part of both Egyptian and Moroccan culture. As members are recruited into Islamist and non-
Islamist SMOs, the groups themselves are the ones that must adapt to their environments.   
 At times, the changes are part of a conscious effort of group leaders to adjust to a diverse 
population. The Brotherhood has gone from saying “Islam is the solution” to suggesting an 
Islamic frame of reference. The change in rhetoric demonstrates their ability to adapt.  
Groups can also unconsciously adjust to their society since they are themselves members 
of it. The origins of Kefaya and the February 20
th
 Movement, as coalitions of ideologically 
diverse political parties and groups, were mainly a byproduct of ideologically and historically 
diverse members. Kefaya’s leaders have historical roots in Nasser pan-Arabism and Islamic 
student movements. The F20M has similar roots in Islamic activism, but also incorporates the 
Moroccan Berber movement. Group leaders must actively respond in order to communicate 
external changes to their existing members. 
If one was only to look at the four SMOs’ ideologies one could say that Islam is just a 
tool to be used when convenient for recruitment and mobilization. On the contrary, Al Adl and 
the Brotherhood’s division of their organizational structures into religious and non-religious 
arms led to leadership polarization and splinter groups.  The F20M and Kefaya, in contrast, 
emerged with decentralized organizational structures that allowed both devout Muslims and 
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liberals to join. The groups’ flexibility provided ideological and structural room for Islam 
without dividing the groups into factions.  
Despite the tactics of repressive regimes, Islam is still largely present in the political 
realm. Constant interaction between Al Adl and the F20M in Morocco, and Kefaya and the 
Brotherhood in Egypt, has resulted in both cooperation and clashes. Ideological differences 
between generations have caused a proliferation of moderate Islamist political parties. The states, 
too, have instigated symbolic battles with opposition groups. In Morocco, the regime claims to 
hold ultimate religious authority and criticized emerging Islamist groups. In Egypt, the regime 
tacitly submits to the religious legitimacy of Al Azhar and the Brotherhood. For both regimes, it 
is impossible to take Islam out of politics. For the SMOs, interaction with Islamists is 
unavoidable. Those who choose to participate in the political realm often get access to new 
organizational resources. 
 The intention of my study was not to connect a SMO’s success to Islam. Evident in my 
results, Islam both benefits and restricts groups from being able to function. Instead, I hope to 
have demonstrated religion’s continuing role within SMOs. Daily rituals, practices, and beliefs 
of devout Muslims carry over into these groups in different ways. By separating the functions of 
an SMO, I have provided the way in which Islam connects to the Moroccan and Egyptian 
groups. Further research on other Islamist SMOs in the Middle East will strengthen the 
connection between social movement theory and religion. Scholars must not look to modernity 
or explicit ideologies as the only forms of mobilization in the Middle East and Muslim world. 
They must, instead, focus on the interrelatedness of the structural and micro-sociological factors 
present in the Arab Spring.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 1.1 – SMOs in the Study 
Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) 
Group Name Ideology Country 
The February 20th Movement (F20M) 
Non-
Islamist Morocco 
Al-Adl wal Ihsan (Justice and Charity group ) Islamist 
Kefaya (Egyptian Movement for Change) 
Non-
Islamist 
Egypt 
The Muslim Brotherhood (el-ekhwan al-
muslimun)  
Islamist 
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Table 1.2 - Coding Protocol 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND LEADERSHIP 
1.  Organizational structure 
- What kind of organizational hierarchy, if any, existed within the group (branches, cells, councils, etc.)? Did 
they have a separate political wing? 
2. Leadership 
- How are the decisions made by the leaders within group? What are the demographics of the leaders? 
3. Member demographics/ Profile 
- What were the demographics of members within the group (age, occupation, income, religion, etc.)? 
4. Means of communication 
- What were the means of communication within the group (flyers, twitter, sermons, etc.)? 
 
RECRUITMENT AND ACTIVITIES 
1. Non protest, group activities 
- What daily activities or events (Quran readings, Friday sermons, etc.) did each group engage in outside of 
protesting? Where did the group have these activities or meetings? 
2. Recruitment methods 
- How did the organizations recruit its members? 
 
IDEOLOGIES, IDEAS, AND BELIEFS 
1. Explicit Ideology 
- What are the explicit ideologies of the group? And were there moments where the group’s ideology changed? 
2. Narratives and stories 
- What stories, myths, or other narratives did the group frequently mention?  
3. Organizational Goals/demands 
- What were the group’s explicit goals and demands? 
4. Protest Slogans 
- What slogans were used by the group's members during protests, rallies, and demonstrations? 
 
RELATIONSHIPS 
1. Membership Trend 
- When did the group’s membership peak and what was the membership size right up to the most recent 
protests? 
2. Relationship to other SMOs 
- What alliances did groups build with each other (worker-student, cleric-worker, etc.)? 
3. Relationship with Islamic groups/ institution 
- What relationships and affiliations did the group, and their leaders, have with religious figures, mosques, and 
other community organizers? 
4. Relationship with political groups 
- Did the group have any connections to legal political parties? 
 
MISCELLANEOUS  
1. External Events 
- Were there any significant international or regional events that dramatically altered discourse or use of Islam 
in daily life (terrorist attacks, foreign occupancy, and massive crackdowns)?  
2. Founding date 
3. Different spellings of group name 
 
  
Hatem M. Hassan 
40 
 
Table 1.3– Results 
 
(a) Organizational and Leadership Structures 
Code Name Quotations 
Organizational Structure 92 20% 
Leadership 136 30% 
Membership demographics 158 34% 
Means of Communication 75 16% 
Total 461 100% 
   
   (b) Recruitment and Non-Protest Activities 
Code Name Quotations 
Non-Protest group activities 148 73% 
Mobilization Methods 54 27% 
Total 202 100% 
   
   (c) Ideologies, Ideas, and Beliefs 
Code Name Quotations 
Explicit Ideology 266 30% 
Organizational Goals/Demands 217 24% 
Symbols and Rituals at Protests 189 21% 
Narratives 127 14% 
Protest Slogans 95 11% 
Total 894 100% 
   
   
(d) Relationships with Other Groups 
Code Name Quotations 
Relationship to Other SMOs 257 40% 
Relationships with Islamic Groups/Institutions 213 33% 
Relationships with Political Groups 146 23% 
Membership Trends 22 3% 
Total 638 100% 
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Table 1.4 - Selected Slogans and Quotes from SMO Members 
 
MB Kefaya Al Adl F20M 
Islam is the Solution 
No to inheritance, no to 
extension. No Mubarak! 
For Dignity and 
Freedom! No 
constitution without 
freedom. 
we love our country, we 
love our king, but we are 
against corruption and 
economic and political 
monopoly 
In the police station, 
poor people who are 
innocent get tortured 
and mistreated while 
the thieves aren't 
prosecuted 
kifaya to dictators, kifaya 
to corruptions, and kifaya 
to the silence of Arabs 
eager for change 
People in the U.S. 
and Europe always 
say Morocco is free. 
But if you look here, it 
isn't true. 
We the sons of the 
prisoners who are victims 
of the anti-terrorism law 
call for the release of our 
fathers  
Those who did 
injustice are not 
brought to justice 
Enough Unemployment, 
Enough Poverty, Enough 
of the Dictatorship 
What kind of justice is 
this? Is it because the 
Americans give them 
money? 
This era is an era of 
bribery; bribery rules 
everything; enough 
bribery, our 
 pockets are empty. 
A civil state with an 
Islamic frame of 
reference 
Shame, shame, shame! 
For the imprisonment of 
the honorable and free,  
It is unjust that the 
country's riches 
should be 
monopolized by a 
minority 
Peaceful, peaceful until 
the realization of freedom 
Freedom, freedom! 
Where, where? 
One movement, one hand, 
one issue -- freedom! 
Listen to the voice of 
the people 
The people want change, 
not just patching up 
Together for reform. 
Free University. Free 
Homeland. 
We are not slaves or 
property. God created us 
free people,"  
No to terrorism, a 
king who reigns but 
does not govern 
O brave Moroccan, 
boycotting is the solution 
Participation, not 
domination 
The Americans have sold 
us out.  
No to corruption, End 
social injustice 
the people want the 
martyr's killers 
 
Table 1.5 – Affiliated Coalition Groups 
February 20th Movement Coalition Members   Kefaya Coalition Members 
Al Adl Wal Ihsane (Justice and Charity)    Al-Karama Party (the Nasserites) 
 the far-left small party the Democratic Path   
The Revolutionary Socialist Organization (Marxist-
Socialists) 
 the Moroccan Association for Human Rights   Al-ghad Party (Liberals) 
the United Socialist Party(PSU)   Al-Wasat Party (Islamist- MB splinter group) 
the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (usfp)   Hizb Al-Amal (Islamist Labor Party) 
Istiqlal Party 
 
The Amazigh [Berber] Youth Movement 
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